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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
As it is her appeal, Astill prefers her Statement of the Issues to Clark's. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Astill's statement of Nature of the Case is more fact specific than Clark's. In 
Clark's Answer, she does not reply to those facts and issues stated by Astill. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Astill's Statement of Facts is more fact specific because it states in detail 
facts presented by both sides. 
Astill disagrees with Clark's ffl 1, at page 5, which states that Astill's counsel 
made an issue of Clark's impact speed in his opening statement, claiming this 
established proof of precise impact speed was part of Astill's case in chief. 
As opening statements were not transcribed, recitation of the statement is 
a matter of the memory of counsel. Recollection is aided by the argument between 
the Court and counsel at the conclusion of Clark's case as to whether Astill could 
call rebuttal witnesses. The Court asked Astill's counsel why, if they knew speed 
was a factor, they hadn't put Mr. Lord on in their case in chief, the Court saying it 
was persuaded that Turner v. Nelson required that. (R731, L. 12 - 23) 
Counsel replied: 
"MR. KING: It is a matter of the shift of the burden of proof, 
your Honor. We had the burden of proving there was an accident, 
and resulting from the accident there was an injury. The defense said 
they would prove that the impact was sufficiently low speed, that the 
injury would probably not have occurred. They may not have put on 
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that defense depending on how our case went. Depending on how 
effectively they put their case on, we may or may not need the 
expense of a rebuttal witness. But we certainly don't need to take the 
time of the Court and of the jury with rebuttal witnesses until they 
have carried their burden of proof by showing they have a serious 
challenge to our version of the facts. At that point we called the 
rebuttal witness, and that was what the rebuttal witness is for, and this 
is the classic use of it." (R731 L. 24 - R732 L.12) 
"MR. KING: I didn't have — I didn't care what speed was 
testified to. When she talked about speed and measurements and so 
forth, I said those are approximations. She acknowledged that. She 
said it was at least ten miles an hour. But ten miles was not vital to 
our case. 
"THE COURT: It is three times the amount of the anticipated 
testimony of the defense expert. You said that you have known all 
along he was going to estimate this speed at three to four miles an 
hour, even if you went at ten miles an hour. 
"MR. KING: Supposing they decided not to call Mr. Knight. 
"THE COURT: It would have been a plus for you, probably. 
"MR. KING: Possibly. But the thing is I don't have to put on 
testimony that speed is a factor in the injury until they put on 
testimony that it is not." (R741 L. 6 - 22) 
This dialog with the Court confirms Astill's counsel recollection of his opening 
statement, that he told the jury that Mrs. Astill who had estimated Clark's speed at 
15 -25 mph in her deposition was obviously too high because there would have 
been more damage to her car. Similarly, Mrs. Clark's deposition testimony that she 
merely touched the Astill vehicle was too low because the Astill Explorer bumper 
brackets were bent. As a result, Astill's counsel told the jury that the exact speed 
was unknown, but didn't have to be determined. What Astill would prove was that 
there was an impact sufficient to damage her car and injure her. 
2 
It was defense that made an issue of exact speed. This is further confirmed 
in the argument with the Court when the Court said: 
"THE COURT: You don't have to put anything on in a civil 
defense. They could have rested at the conclusion of your case, sent 
it to the jury, and let the jury do what they want to. 
"MR. KING: They might have come up with 15 other theories. 
"THE COURT: What they might have done and what they in 
fact did do are worlds apart, and the Court is of the opinion that you 
simply cannot sandwich the defense with testimony that you have 
known and anticipated right from the beginning, and hope to maybe 
get the last word in. I don't know what it is. 
"MR. KING: I didn't know what to have Mr. Lord say until I 
heard exactly what Mr. Knight said and exactly the bases that he 
used. I couldn't use Mr. Lord in advance." (R742, L. 10-24) 
The Court's whole conceptual error that Plaintiff had to put in her case in 
chief evidence anticipating the defense is traceable directly to defense counsel 
misquoting Turner v. Nelson. The Court said: 
"THE COURT: Let the Court reason outloud for a moment on 
the record, and then I will invite both counsel to respond. The Court 
has been cited by both counsel to the case of Turner vs. Nelson. It 
is a Supreme Court case decided March of 1994. The holding in that 
case regarding the calling of rebuttal witnesses centered on whether 
or not the evidence sought to be rebutted could reasonably have 
been anticipated prior to trial. If it could, then the witness should be 
called in the case in chief. 
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"MR. KING: No, your Honor, it is not what the case said. 
(R734, L 13-23) 
That the erroneous ruling of law was due to defense misciting Turner is 
confirmed. 
"MR. HANSEN: Having been counsel for Plaintiff in Turner vs. 
Nelson... 
"THE COURT: Were you on the winning or losing side of that? 
"MR. HANSEN: I was on the side that tried to present the new 
witness. I was on the losing side. We briefed this before the 
Supreme Court. So I know the arguments and the positions of the 
parties and the underlying facts. Let me indicate that I think the 
Court's reading of Turner vs. Nelson is exactly correct..." (R744, L. 
2-11) (Emphasis added.) 
Astill's testimony conformed to the Opening. She said she didn't know how 
fast Clark was going, estimated 15 mph, and said her figures were approximations. 
(R425L 13 - 427 L 21) 
Astill disagrees with Clark's 1J15, page 5, claim that the exclusion of 
witnesses was in the pre-trial order. There is no "pre-trial order." There is only a 
scheduling order (R28 - 29), and it makes no reference to exclusion of witnesses. 
Astill disagrees with Clark's fl16, page 6, as it omits the key factor used by 
Mr. Knight in his assessment of speed. This is covered in Astill's brief at pages 6 -
8, quoting Mr. Knight's repeated testimony that the impact speed had to be not over 
four miles an hour or the Taurus bumper would have deformed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Concerning Clark's arguments in the last two paragraphs at page 10, 
that Astill is at fault for knowingly chosing to forego deposing Mr. Knight or 
choosing a neurologist of her own to attend her IME, please see Economic 
Realities, at page 14. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO CALL 
REBUTTAL WITNESSES WHEN THEIR PURPOSE WAS TO REBUT 
WRONG TESTIMONY GIVEN BY CLARK'S EXPERT 
CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Astill stands primarily on the statements in her brief, pages 13-21. 
Astill takes exception to the statement in Clark's brief at page 12, bottom 
paragraph, that during the argument on Astill's right to call a rebuttal witness, he 
made a false statement of law regarding the duty of each party to carry its own 
burden of proof. Clark cites Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 467,471 (Utah App. 1993). 
A reading of that case will show it has no holding as Clark argues. 
Responding to the heart of Clark's argument, which appears to be that if a 
plaintiff knows that the other side will raise a point in its defense, that the plaintiff 
has to anticipate that point in their case in chief, even though not vital to their 
stating of a prima facie case and even though the rebuttal would be restricted to 
new matter raised by the defense. Astill submits that is not the law. 
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Clark cites Sirotiakv. H.C. Price. 758 P.2d 1271, 1278 (Alaska 1988), "that 
plaintiff may not ignore known defense theories...." Clark did not include the 
beginning statement in that paragraph which states, "Although the plaintiff is not 
required to anticipate defenses..." 
Astill notes that Clark, at page 15, restates the argument that Turner v. 
Nelson, supra, stands for the proposition that rebuttal witnesses should be excluded 
if Astill "knew or should have reasonably anticipated the defense," as Plaintiff 
should call such witnesses in the case in chief. 
While more moderately stated than at trial, defense's use again of Turner v. 
Nelson for a rule of law it does not make, lends support to Astill's Brief Point 7, 
pages 35 - 38, that this Court should consider an award of fees. 
Clark's Point I gives the view that the trial court's decision to exclude Astill's 
rebuttal witnesses was merely a matter of routine case management well within the 
discretion of the trial court. Clark does this by avoiding mention of the errors of Mr. 
Knight, or the affidavits of Hardle or Lord in Astill's Brief, Ex. 7&8. 
As Astill will demonstrate, if the rebuttal evidence is reliable, probative, and 
crucial, the court abuses its case management discretion in rejecting it. 
Weiss v. Chrysler Corporation, 515 F.2d 449 (1975) involved the appellate 
reversal and remand for new trial of a trial court's ruling excluding Plaintiff's rebuttal 
witnesses to facts and theories presented by defense, which Plaintiff had not had 
to deal with in order to present her prima facie case, holding that plaintiff had no 
duty as part of her case in chief to negate manufacturer's theory. The Court held 
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as a ground for reversal that the trial court improperly excluded the rebuttal 
evidence stating: 
"While a trial judge has discretion to exclude rebuttal evidence 
which would have been admissible if offered as evidence in chief, 
such discretion should be tempered greatly where the probative value 
of the proffered evidence is potentially high and where such 
evidence, though admissible in the case in chief, was unnecessary for 
the plaintiff to establish in its prima facie case. We believe that the 
proffered testimony of Rader, (plaintiffs excluded rebuttal witness) 
even if it might have been part of plaintiff's case in chief, was not 
merely cumulative and should have been admitted in the exercise of 
sound judicial discretion. 
"...But we also believe that Rader's testimony was not 
necessarily a part of plaintiff's case in chief. Plaintiff presented a 
prima facie case that the steering mechanism was defective. Her own 
testimony that the steering failed, the finding of a twice-fractured 
Pitman arm stud after the accident, and the testimony of the experts 
that the first fatigue fracture could have been followed by a final 
complete fracture before the car left the road satisfied her burden to 
go forward. She had made her prima facie case. In the words of 
Wigmore 'For matters properly not evidential until the rebuttal, the 
proponent has a right to put them in at that time, and they are not 
subject to the discretionary exclusion of the trial court... matters of 
true rebuttal could not have been put in before, and to exclude them 
now would be to deny them their sole opportunity for admission.' 
"That does not mean, of course, that in every case where 
evidence is improperly excluded on rebuttal there must be a new trial. 
On the contrary we must approach such questions with a rational 
liberality. The problem here is that the issue was crucial (emphasis 
added). The jury was entitled to hear the evidence and the plaintiff 
had no cause or duty to go forward to negate in its case in chief the 
defense opinion of Mazur negating as the cause of the accident the 
defect in the Pitman arm stud. The plaintiff was not required to offer 
evidence which positively excluded every other possible cause of the 
accident...' (Emphasis added.) 
'Where the proponent has found it necessary or desirable, by 
reason of the opponent's cross examination, partly to anticipate his 
case in rebuttal by going to it during his case in chief, -for example, 
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on a re-direct examination; here he may take up the same subject 
again during the rebuttal.' 
"Since we have found that the exclusion of Rader's testimony 
was critical because of its relevance to the central issue of the case, 
its exclusion is manifest error. The testimony excluded in this battle 
of experts might have changed the verdict." (Emphasis added.) 
(Citations omitted.) 
Astill submits that Weiss states the general law, and mentions that a careful 
reading of all cases cited by Clark finds none requiring that Astill in a fact situation 
comparable to the one at bar need anticipate the defense by rebutting it in the 
Plaintiff's case in chief. 
Two Utah cases published after Astill's brief establish tests on each point, 
probativeness and importance, that Astill accepts and incorporates. 
In State v. Pearson, 323 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (8/12/97), Defendant sought to 
rebut the State's evidence concerning his intent to kill in a shooting by use of a 
reconstruction test which would lead to a different result concerning his intent. 
Justice Durham noted that the comparison test accounted for only some of the 
factors and said: 
"Thus, the evidence did not serve a significant probative function. 
"With regard to unfair prejudice, among the important variables 
of the nature of the evidence offered, the gualitv of the other evidence 
available to the finder of fact, and the centralitv of the issue to which 
the scientific evidence is directed...." (Emphasis added.) 
Astill accepts this criteria that for there to be error the excluded evidence 
must have had a high probative value and been central to the issues. That Mr. 
Knight erred, is no longer in dispute. 
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We begin at the trial level with Astill's New Trial Motion. Annexed were the 
Affidavits of Lord and of Hardle (Astill Brief, Ex. 7, 8). Mr. Knight testified at trial 
that the Taurus had four different bumper support systems. Lord and Hardle said 
it only had one. Reconstructionists own and have access to automobile parts 
books. They use them continually for matters just such as this. If the Taurus in fact 
had four support systems, Clark would have filed a rebuttal affidavit including pages 
from the parts books. She didn't because she couldn't. 
Similarly, on appeal, Clark makes no mention at all of Knight's error on this 
vital point. The effect is that having had the opportunity to point out that Astill's 
experts were wrong, instead she has vacated the field, thereby conceding they are 
right. 
The dynamics of the trial, as stated in Astill's Brief on Appeal Point 1, is the 
reason Mr. Knight gave the wrong testimony. 
In probing his foundation to give his speed opinions, Astill's counsel asked 
him if he knew the impact force necessary to bend the Taurus bumper supports. 
Rather than admit that he did not know the answer, which had a major bearing on 
impact speed, he said he couldn't answer because the Taurus had four different 
series of bumper support systems, and, as Clark's vehicle had been rented, 
returned to the renter, and could not be located, he couldn't tell which support 
system hers had and so couldn't answer the question. In so answering, he 
creatively and persuasively avoided having to admit that he knew so little about the 
Taurus that he couldn't answer the question. 
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This error in Knight's testimony had to be rebutted. It affects the jury's entire 
view as to his credibility or, here, the lack thereof. 
As to Knight's other error, Clark has also admitted the accuracy of Astill's 
claim that the Taurus bumper rebounds from an impact up to over 15 mph without 
deforming (Lord Affidavit, 1J7, 8, Hardle Affidavit, <f|5 -10). As with the parts books, 
data is available as to the basic impact absorption and reaction characteristics of 
the Taurus bumper. No such data, nor any knowledgeable contradicting affidavit 
was filed. Before this Court, Clark makes no mention of Mr. Knight's wrong impact 
absorption testimony, nor of its affect on the jury. 
In sum, on the record, Knight's errors are admitted. 
Thus, Astill's excluded rebuttal evidence meets the "probative value" test. 
Astill now goes to the second part of the equation, importance or cruciality, 
as stated in the other recent Utah case, Jones v Cyprus Plateau Mining, Corp., 323 
Utah Adv. Rpt 15 (8/12/97). Jones reviews and applies the Utah test to determine 
if error in exclusion of evidence is prejudicial. In Jones, admission of proof of failure 
of an employer, Defendant, to receive a Mine Safety and Health Administration 
citation for wrongdoing, was offered as probative to the jury of the fact that MSHA 
had investigated and had not found Defendant's conduct wrongful. The trial court 
refused to admit the evidence. 
There was an issue as to whether the trial court abused its discretion under 
Rule 403 U.R.E., in excluding the evidence, but the appellate court held it did not 
have to reach the Rule 403 issue because whether the trial court erred was 
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immaterial as Defendant couldn't prove the error was prejudicial. The Court said 
there was no prejudice as on the facts whether the admission of the excluded 
evidence would have influenced the jury was "mere speculation." 
The appellate court held, and this is the test Astill accepts: 
"Harmful error occurs where 'the likelihood of a different verdict is 
"sufficiently high so as to undermine confidence in the verdict."' 
"....Because Cyprus has not demonstrated that it was prejudiced by 
the trial court's ruling to exclude this evidence, we need not consider 
its other contention." 
When a jury hears unrebutted evidence by an expert it can assume the 
evidence would have been rebutted if it were not accurate. If that testimony is 
incontrovertibly and absolutely wrong, exclusion of rebuttal destroys plaintiff's 
chance of being believed by the jury. This makes rebuttal of Mr. Knight crucial 
evidence. 
The only remaining basis to sustain the trial court's exclusion of rebuttal is 
its mistaken belief that Plaintiff had to anticipate the defense by putting evidence 
relating to the defense in the case in chief. Clark still argues as she did at trial that 
Turner v. Nelson so holds. (Clark Answer P. 15, 25) Astill replies that Turner does 
not hold that nor is it the law. (See infra, page 1-4) 
This general rule is restated at 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence, §158: 
"As a rule, a party is under no obligation to anticipate and negate in 
its own case in chief any facts or theories that may be raised by 
another party." 
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In accord, Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., Tex App., 632 S.W. 2d 375 (1982). 
Finally,In Pitasi v. Stratton Corp., 968 F.2d 1558 (2nd Cir. 1992), the 
appellate court held: 
"It is well-settled that a trial court's determination concerning 
the order of proof and the scope of rebuttal testimony will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. However, 'such discretion 
should be tempered greatly where the probative value of proffered 
evidence is potentially high and where such evidence, though 
admissible on the case in chief, was unnecessary for the plaintiff to 
establish in its prima facie case.' 
'The testimony that Pitasi sought to elicit was not necessary for 
its prima facie case. Rather, it would have served the permissible 
rebuttal function of in fact impeaching Stratton's witnesses who have 
testified during its case-in-chief that the side entrances to this trail 
had never been closed. Because this testimony was highly relevant 
and material to impeach the credibility of defendant's employees, we 
hold that the district court erred in excluding it." (Citations omitted.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 2 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT ALLOWING ASTILUS 
DESIGNATED EXPERT TO SIT BESIDE. AND ASSIST, ASTILUS 
COUNSEL DURING TESTIMONY OF CLARK'S KEY ACCIDENT 
RECONSTRUCTION EXPERT. 
Astill stands on the point as she stated it in her Brief pages 21 - 25. 
Clark in her Answer says the trial court has discretion to exclude all 
witnesses. That discretion is not unfettered. 
To start, Rule 615, U.R.E., does not authorize the Court to exclude "(c) A 
person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of 
the parties' cause." 
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Mr. Lord has already been shown as being vital because he would have lead 
Astill's counsel to ask the right questions concerning Mr. Knight's errors on bumper 
deformation and multiple bumper support systems. 
Morvant v. Const. Aggregates Corp., 570 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1978) is a case 
where a trial court's refusal to allow plaintiff's expert to attend testimony of 
defendant's expert, was found a basis for reversal. 
In reversing, the Court stated: 
"We perceive little, if any, reason for sequestering a witness 
who is to testify in an expert capacity only and not to the facts of the 
case. As Professor Wigmore's treatise summarizes: 
The process of sequestration consists merely of 
preventing one prospective witness from being taught 
by hearing another's testimony...' 
"Theoretically at least, the presence in the courtroom of an 
expert witness who does not testify of the facts of the case but rather 
gives his opinion based upon the testimony of others hardly seems 
suspect and will in most cases be beneficial, for he will be more likely 
to base his expert opinion on a more accurate understanding of the 
testimony as it evolves before the jury. 
"As made before the trial court, plaintiffs argument for invoking 
subsection (3) appears to be based upon the language of Rule 703 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which at least implies that experts 
will be present in court to hear the evidence: 
The facts or data in a particular case upon which an 
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those 
perceived by or made known to him at or before the 
hearing....' 
"This view has support from Judge Weinstein, who observes: 
'Certainly an expert who intends to base his opinion on 
"facts or data in the particular case" (Rule 703) will be 
13 
unable to testify if he has been excluded [from the court 
room by an order under Rule 615.'" 
Astill takes particular exception to the argument made by Clark in her Brief, 
page 20: 
"B. Any harm to Astill from the exclusion could have been avoided 
if Astill's counsel had taken Knight's deposition before trial." 
Whether a party does, or not retain experts, or conduct extensive discovery, 
is discretionary with the party. 
THE ECONOMIC REALITIES HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED. 
Rule 1, U.R.C.P. says the purpose of the rules is to insure civil litigation will 
be handled in a manner that is "speedy, just, and inexpensive." 
These are three magnificent adjectives, chosen with great care. 
Sometimes we lose sight of Rule 1. Astill submits that it is the foundation of 
all of the other rules, a point of reference by which all civil litigation should be 
regularly measured. Rule 1 applies directly to this case. 
Astill's evidence, supported by her doctor, husband, and co-worker, was that 
the accident really changed her life. If she spent a day hard at work, in office, 
house or yard work, she would have severe pain. She had to give up, or limit, the 
activities she had loved, such as waterskiing and gardening. 
Her medical testimony was that her condition was incurable and permanent, 
that she would have to deal with pain each day of her life. 
What is such a case worth? 
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The possible recovery determines the amount Astill spends. Defendant had 
$25,000 in insurance on her rental car and another $25,000 as her own liability 
limit, a total of $50,000. This by the way is why she has two lawyers, one for each 
insurer. 
Garnishment and executions on Clark's personal assets are subject to 
bankruptcy discharge. 
Astill's lawyer's knew that if the jury accepted Astill's case as true and 
awarded a large verdict, the practical ceiling was $50,000. They knew also that 
many Utah juries bring in conservative verdicts, and Astill might get an award of 
$10,000 - $20,000. Astill's counsel also knew that the real purpose of Clark calling 
two experts, the reconstructionist and the IME neurologist, was to doubly impeach 
Astill. 
Each would say that she misstated on their separate topics. Astill's 
anticipation was correct, as they did so at trial. 
This was a double negative equation. Without spending enough money she 
would be defenseless against Clark's experts. If she spent too much money and 
lost, she would have unpayable debt. 
In a major case, case costs are almost no object, when seven figure, 
collectible, jury verdicts stand as a reward. Those cases are rare. 
The typical automobile accident case maximizes at the defendant's liability 
limits, which are usually low, and then only if the jury can be persuaded to award 
them. 
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Astill is a typical client. She and her husband both worked, so they had an 
adequate income. They had four children to support, all dependent. They spent 
their money carefully. 
A plaintiffs lawyer has to analyze each major case cost with his client before 
he spends the money. How far will a client go? The client knows they are obligated 
for actual expenses, win or lose, and they know most of these expenses are not 
taxable as court costs. 
Astill agreed to spend the money to retain her doctor, agreed to spend the 
money to pay the expert witnesses5 time charges to depose Dr. Nord, and agreed 
to spend the money to retain Mr. Lord, after Mr. Knight had been named as the 
defense witness. Those are major expenses. 
Judge Brian's ruling that the only allowable monitor at her IME (Point 4, 
supra) would have to be a specialist in the same field as Dr. Nord, a neurologist. 
What would Astill's costs be to retain a neurologist for herself, knowing he would 
charge her at least $300 an hour? 
Her counsel would have to talk to him long enough to acquaint him with the 
issues and get his acceptance, he would first have to review her entire medical 
chart, he would travel to Dr. Nord's office and wait with her, an hour as it turned out, 
until Dr. Nord examined her, he would sit through the examination, he would read 
and critique Dr. Nord's report, he would spend adequate time with Plaintiff's counsel 
to prepare for trial, and then he would go to trial. This is an expense of at least 10 
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hours, $3,000, and very possibly twice that figure. Astill couldn't afford a 
neurologist. Judge Brian gave her a remedy she couldn't afford. 
Considering all that Astill spent, could she afford to depose Mr. Knight? 
There would not just be the cost of the court reporter. Deposing the opposing expert 
requires a commitment to pay his expert time fee for preparation, travel and 
attendance. 
While her counsel told her they would like to depose Mr. Knight, they also 
told her that he was considered predictable and, if Mr. Lord sat in during his 
testimony, he could probably be effectively impeached. 
If deposing Mr. Knight had been absolutely vital, Astill might have authorized 
the expense. Hard pressed as she was, she declined. She should not be faulted 
for that. 
Let us assume she got a $30,000 verdict. If she takes out $7,000 - $10,000 
for costs, takes out a third for fees, pays $3,000 back on her PIP, and more money 
for her other lien holding health insurers, she can look forward to taking $5,000 -
$10,000 home. 
The figures are realistic and routine. There is something wrong with this 
equation. The person with a permanent injury who wins her case needs better 
compensation. 
Of course, plaintiffs urge that the minimum limit in Utah on liability coverage 
be $100,000. This is supported by the social argument that the increase from 
$25,000 costs little in premiums, and keeps many injured people from becoming 
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welfare recipients. That though is not a matter now before this court except as 
illustrative of argument. 
Costs of case preparation and presentation are. They have become 
destructive to the goals of Rule 1. 
The indulgence of this Court is requested to now apply these observations 
to the facts of the case. 
Astill's decision not to spend money to depose Mr. Knight nor retain her own 
neurologist, is her legitimate decision based on two factors - what she could afford 
to spend and how vital the expense was to her case. She could legitimately 
consider whether an economic decision would hurt her, but not destroy her. She 
had constantly to judge between presenting a perfect case and managing her family 
assets. In this she is typical. 
Anticipating Point 4, supra, Judge Brian's order authorizing her to obtain a 
neurologist to attend Dr. Nord's IME, but not allowing her to videotape that exam, 
at virtually no cost, is in context of this discussion, patently untenable. He gave her 
a right without a remedy. 
Although Rule 35(a) U.R.C.P. gives the Court the right to refuse an IME, this 
discretion is almost never invoked in a tort case. The trial court routinely makes two 
decisions in such cases. First, the IME is allowed. Second, defense may choose 
the examiner no matter how extreme his reputation for partiality may be. The third 
routine order should be that the IME be videotaped. 
Frequently it is the manner of the IME that is defective. 
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This case proves the point. Mrs. Astill claimed that she had fibrositis arising 
from the accident. Dr. Nord testified he found no symptoms of it. 
Mrs. Astill, who gives therapy to people who have fibrositis, testified that she 
is familiar with fibrositis trigger points and that he did not palpate hers. 
This produced a great contradiction between Astill and Dr. Nord. 
Videotaping the IME would have also been preferable to her having her own 
neurologist attend. Had he done so, he would have testified the examination was 
inadequate. Dr. Nord would have testified that it was adequate. Then the jury 
would have to judge, or guess, between them as it gauged their credibility. 
The videotape would have shown whether he precisely palpated the 
appropriate trigger point areas or not. Facts beat theories. Seeing beats 
interpretation. 
Astill's counsel do not need to prove that every IME is slanted for the 
company that hires the doctor. Actually, two years ago counsel saw an IME that 
agreed with the plaintiff's attending physicians. He has noted that that doctor has 
never resurfaced on another IME. 
The possibility that the IME might be slanted, or equally that it might be 
perfectly performed and that the plaintiff complains unduly, is a real possibility. 
Either way if the dispute concerns the manner of the examination, the videotape 
preserves the evidence better than any other mechanism. 
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Defenders know that they can spend plaintiffs into positions where they can't 
respond. After all, plaintiffs frequently have interrupted earnings as a result of their 
accident. 
Mrs. Astill asks that her economic decisions not be used against her by the 
very party who forced her to make them. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 4 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING ASTILL'S MOTION TO HAVE 
HER ATTENDING PHYSICIAN ATTEND THE INDEPENDENT 
MEDICAL EXAMINATION GIVEN ASTILL BY CLARK'S 
DESIGNATED DOCTOR OR ALTERNATIVELY TO ALLOW 
VIDEOTAPING OF THE I.M.E. DURING TRIAL THERE WAS A 
CONFLICT BETWEEN ASTILL AND THAT DOCTOR AS TO THE 
ADEQUACY OF THE EXAMINATION GIVEN HER BY HIM AS THIS 
RESULTED IN A DIRECT CONFRONTATION OF CREDIBILITY 
BETWEEN THE TWO THAT COULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED AND 
AVOIDED BY AN APPROPRIATE MONITOR OF THE 
EXAMINATION. 
Astill submits the matter as argued by both sides, with reference to her 
preceding Economic Reality argument. Astill also submits that, "statutes or rules 
in particular jurisdictions may accord a litigant the right, or at least the opportunity, 
to have his or her attorney or physician present during a medical examination by 
an opponent's doctor." 84ALR4th 558, Counsel or Doctor at Examination. 
Further, Michigan Court Rules state that the litigant has the right to a monitor 
(See Nemes v. Smith. 194 NW 2d 440). Also specific statues in Illinois (cited in 
McDaniel v. Toledo. 36 FR Serv 2d 101) and in the state of California (cited in 




ASTILL IS ENTITLED TO FEES AS THE COURT'S PRIMARY 
ERROR WAS IN EXCLUDING ASTILL'S REBUTTAL WITNESSES 
AND THE COURT WAS LED INTO THIS ERROR BY KNOWINGLY 
WRONG ARGUMENT CONCERNING TURNER v. NELSON. 882 
P2d. 1021 (Utah 1994). 
Astill refers to page 1-4, infra. 
Astill notes that Clark at pages 15 and 25 of her Answer still maintains that 
her counsel made a good faith argument, that Turner v. Nelson supports the 
proposition that Astill has to anticipate a defense in her case in chief rather than by 
meeting the defense in rebuttal. Turner never said that. Turner dealt with a suprise 
rebuttal witness. Mr. Lord was identified as a rebuttal witness to Clark's counsel 
over one month before trial. He was not a suprise. 
Clark's counsel, Mr. Hansen, was counsel for Turner in that case and on the 
appeal. He told this to Judge Brian and it naturally enhanced his credibility - he 
was the resident expert on the point. 
The effect on Astill was tremendous. Turner was the only case submitted to 
Judge Brian in Clark's motion to exclude Mr. Lord and Mr. Hardle as rebuttal. 
Except for that misleading argument, there is a good probability that Mr. Lord and 
Mr. Hardle would have testified. Had they done so, there is an overwhelming 
probability that Astill would have obtained a verdict. 
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When counsel submits a single case to a judge on a surprise motion, 
counsel must be constrained to cite that case accurately. Defense counsel did not 
do so. 
While it may be hard to hold them liable for fees, it is much harder for Mrs. 
Astiil to have to fund a second trial, this appeal and endure the long wait between 
trials. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff prays relief as in her Brief on Appeal. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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